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Soft power can be exerted by a variety of actors using different channels and tools. This paper focuses on 
actors and channels transmitting Russian messages and discourses in the Eastern Partnership countries. It 
contributes to enhancing our understanding of Russian influences in the region in two ways. First, it maps the 
network of influential actors who have the potential to transmit Russian messages and target various 
audiences. Second, it offers a detailed analysis of the coverage of Russia (and the European Union (EU)) in one 
important channel for dissemination of information about Russia and the EU: popular TV stations in Belarus, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. The analysis shows the presence of a wide variety of actors focusing on ‘compatriots’, 
religious bonds, and Russian-language speakers in the region, which reflects the key ideas of the ‘Russian 
World’ narrative. These actors promote Russia’s role as a centre of gravity and aim to appeal to Russians, Slavs 
and Orthodox Christians. This image of Russia, however, does not dominate the news programmes in any of 
the three countries. In Moldova and Ukraine, Russia is most often mentioned (negatively) in the context of 
security, while in Belarus it is covered more often than the EU in economy-related news items. Moreover, a 
large portion of the news about Russia and the EU has no positive or negative tone or is presented in a 
balanced way. In general, apart from what was conveyed by Russian TV channels, Russia does not have a more 
positive image than the EU in the news programmes in the countries we monitored.  
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1.  Introduction1 
 
The spread of Russian influence in the world through targeted use of TV news, printed or social media, paid 
commentators (‘trolls’), and ‘fake news’ is rapidly becoming the subject of an increasing number of academic, 
professional, and political analyses (Galeotti 2016; Nimmo 2016; Pomeranzev and Weiss 2014; Volchek and 
Sindelar 2015). While just a few years ago the influence of Russian (mis)information tools and messages may 
have been underestimated by most observers, currently there is a veritable explosion of studies emphasizing 
the informational aspects of ‘hybrid warfare’ (Pomeranzev and Weiss 2014). Russian state-owned media 
outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik and the impact of the messages they carry on public opinion have 
been the subject of growing interest by the scientific and analyst community. At his meeting with President 
Vladimir Putin in May 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly identified them as “organs of 
influence and propaganda” (McAuley 2017). Yet the role of national and local news reporting in transmitting a 
Russian perspective to their viewers and the function of public personalities or civic organizations in reinforcing 
Russia’s messages may be just as important, but remains less well understood. Daily news on TV, together with 
discourses and ideas spread on social media and transmitted through the work of cultural, migrant and 
religious organizations could have considerable impact on activating existing identities, creating linkages, and 
changing perceptions of Russia and its role in Europe and the world.  
 
This paper focuses on news, actors and channels transmitting Russian messages and discourses in the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) countries. It contributes to enhancing our understanding of Russian influences in the region 
in two ways. First, it maps the network of influential actors who have the potential to transmit Russian 
messages and target various audiences. Second, it offers a detailed analysis of the coverage of Russia (and the 
European Union (EU)) in one important channel for dissemination of information about Russia and the EU: 
popular TV stations in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. By mapping the actors and channels that promote 
Russian influence in the region and by exploring the messages that regular people in these countries get via the 
most popular TV channels, we outline the shape of the ‘transmission belt’ of Russian messages in the three 
countries, or at least the portion of it that is publicly visible.  
 
To achieve the first goal, we identify the main channels and actors that are linked to Russia or transmit and 
promote Russian messages. This allows us to establish whether the different orientations of ruling political 
elites in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine affect the presence of pro-Russian actors in society. This exercise has 
broad theoretical relevance, as the presence of actors and organizations connected to an external actor, or 
‘linkages’, has been defined as one of the two key mechanisms for the transmission of the influence of such 
actors (Levitsky and Way 2005; Way and Levitsky 2007; Tolstrup 2013)2.  
 
By mapping the channels and actors, we also engage with the literature on authoritarian diffusion versus 
externally supported democratization (Ambrosio 2007, 2010; Delcour and Wolczuk 2015; Lankina et al. 2016; 
Sasse 2016). We depart from Levitsky and Way’s argument that linkages to the West (defined as the density of 
ties with an external actor) and Western leverage (defined as the vulnerability to external pressure) raise the 
                                                          
1 We thank Tomila Lankina and Ramūnas Vilpišauskas for their useful comments. 
2 The second key mechanism is ‘leverage’, which refers to economic influence and interdependence. While we 
recognize the importance of leverage, analysing economic leverage and dependence on Russian energy sources 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 




cost of authoritarianism for domestic political elites (Levitsky and Way 2010). Together with Sasse (2016), we 
assume that non-Western linkages and (Russian) leverage are factors that, in turn, raise the cost of 
democratization and—by extension—the costs of complying with EU-driven reforms. We argue that a reversed 
perspective on linkages and leverage provides us with insights about the likely obstacles for the EU in 
supporting EaP countries towards further democratic reforms. More specifically, we argue that the greater the 
vulnerability to Russian pressure (leverage) and the denser the linkages between local actors and Russian 
organizations, the more difficult it would be for EaP countries to pursue a pro-democratic agenda and EU-
supported reform.  
 
The second goal of this paper is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the coverage of and messages about Russia 
and the EU transmitted by what are arguably some of the most important channels with the largest audiences, 
namely TV stations in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Just like the EU, whose messages we analysed in a 
previous paper (Dimitrova et al. 2016), Russia addresses the three countries in very different ways. There are a 
number of strategic considerations that could affect the messages and discourses pro-Russian actors develop in 
the Eastern neighbourhood. We can expect that major developments such as the conflict with Ukraine would 
affect the context in which Russia attempts to influence the perceptions of citizens in the region. Similarly, 
Russia’s long-term interest in the development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), as observed in our 
analysis of the country's Foreign Policy Concepts (Frear and Mazepus 2017), may be reflected in a focus on 
Belarus as one of the remaining key partners in this integration venture. Moldova, in turn, has been the subject 
of much attention as the presidential electoral campaign recently led to the election of an openly pro-Russian 
president who moved to request observer status in the EAEU. Therefore, we seek to provide a more structural 
and analytical picture of the representations of Russia and the EAEU versus the EU and its member states in 
national TV, and in particular in the main news programmes broadcasted in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.  
 
To address this goal, the second part of the paper presents an original analysis of TV news monitored over a 
period of four months in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine and coded along several dimensions of interest, 
including topic, presence and direction of evaluative tone, news sources, etc. As the majority of citizens of the 
three countries still use television as their main news source,3 a systematic analysis of how the EU and Russia 
come across on national TV is both necessary and informative. Moreover, on the basis of our analysis we are 
able to compare different channels’ representations of Russia and the EU by distinguishing wherever possible 
between private and public TV stations, and between stations using the national language and sources and 
stations using the Russian language and sources. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss current debates on (authoritarian) diffusion and Russian soft 
power and formulate some expectations as a conceptual foundation to guide our analysis. Next, we present 
some of the findings of existing studies of the mechanisms and channels of Russian influence and our current 
snapshot of the landscape of linkages in the three countries. Following the overview of the actors and 
organizations linked to Russia, we present the results of the TV monitoring study in the three countries.4 We 
investigate public and private TV stations as well as TV stations that retransmit materials from Russia or 
                                                          
3 See Ecorys Annual Survey Report (2016) and a summary below (p. 26). 
4 The study contains a wealth of data on trends of TV news reporting in the main channels in the countries in 
question which is presented in more detail in a separate report accompanying this paper. 
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prepare their own content in Russian to understand the representation of Russia (or the EU) they promote and 
the strength of linkages with Russia (including the communication linkage; Levitsky and Way 2006: 383-384). 
 
 
2.  Resisting Democratization or Exercising Soft Power? 
 
The so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in the EaP region, and especially the Rose revolution in Georgia in 2003 and 
the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004, marked a critical juncture in the political development of these 
countries. The new elites took steps towards democratic reforms and away from authoritarian practices 
(Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 460). The effects of these ‘colour’ revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine on their 
domestic and foreign policy, as well as on the Russian leadership, have been profound (Horvath 2011). 
Interpreting changes of power in Ukraine as externally engineered by the democratizing forces in the West, 
Russian leaders developed a set of responses ranging from the military ones, used in Georgia in 2008 and in 
Crimea in 2014, to the restriction of NGOs, to the use of fake news (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015; Pomerantsev 
and Weiss 2014).  
 
The development of ideas and instruments aimed at promoting Russia’s role as a world power and a model of 
governance distinct from liberal democracy became a trend in the mid-2000s (Krastev 2006). These were 
defined by President Putin himself as ‘Russian soft power’, as mentioned in the country’s Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2013. As Lankina and Niemczyk (2014) have argued,  
 
“Russia’s soft power thus rests on a peculiar blend of state-promoted ideology of national 
exclusivity, manipulation of symbols and nostalgia for the halcyon days of the Soviet past, 
Russia’s genuine economic and political attractiveness for migrants escaping far more ghastly 
political and economic environments, and Russian-state media whipped up frenzy about an 
ostensible threat to the Russian ethnos.”  
 
The use of ideas and messages aiming to activate certain perceptions of actors in international relations and 
shape politics also became an important component of Russian strategies to counter democratic diffusion and 
spread power (Hughes and Sasse 2016). “Power ideas, fundamental ideas about how political power should be 
arranged” (Hughes and Sasse 2016: 330), can trigger various ideational linkages and influence perceptions of 
geopolitical realities and the legitimacy of certain actions. As Hughes and Sasse argue, ideational linkages 
proved instrumental in the successful military takeover of Crimea. In particular, Putin’s instrumentalization of 
the ‘power idea’ of nationalism and its activation with regard to Crimea has been made possible by the 
changed domestic political conditions in Ukraine (after 2014) as well as in Russia (Hughes and Sasse 2016: 315-
331). As in other post-Soviet regions, the activation of the nationalist idea and the vision of Russia as a ‘great 
power’ have been accompanied by measures to undermine the pull and attraction of democratic regimes in 
Europe and beyond. Initially, propaganda tools have been deployed not to promote a specific Russian 
authoritarian model, but to undermine democratic diffusion (Ambrosio 2007).  
 
An important dimension of authoritarian diffusion that emerges in the literature is the overt direct support of 
one regime for another, through bolstering incumbents (Ambrosio 2009: 22-23) or leveraging external 




influence (Cameron and Orenstein 2012: 24-37; Tolstrup 2009: 928-929). Whether this should be considered 
authoritarian diffusion depends on whether one accepts the argument that true diffusion can only be 
unintentional and not deliberately pursued. Kneuer and Demmelhuber (2016: 777) have introduced the idea of 
“authoritarian gravity centres” which “induce both the promotion and diffusion of autocracy at the regional 
level”: actively and intentionally in the case of the promotion; passively and unintentionally in the case of 
authoritarian diffusion or contagion. They identify four arenas of interaction with authoritarian gravity centres, 
including linkages and actor-driven influences: 1) institutional; 2) policy; 3) ideational (religion, ideology, 
cultural content, informal networks); and 4) administrative techniques (Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2016: 788-
789). 
 
With respect to Russia, next to direct support of authoritarian leaders or political formations (Pomerantsev and 
Weiss 2014), Russia increasingly aims to create new linkages in neighbouring states or to activate existing ones. 
The funding or creation of NGOs is an element of its soft power strategy, as is the promotion of affiliation with 
the Orthodox Church, particularly the branch led by the Moscow Patriarchate.5 The messages promoted by 
such organizations refer to “pan Slavic identity” and “shared Orthodox faith” (Harding et al. 2017). Just as 
Russia has been using existing trade and energy interdependencies to promote its geopolitical aims (Dimitrova 
and Dragneva 2009) in the past, nowadays it uses culture, language, education and religion to enhance its 
position as a regional or, according to its own narrative, global power.  
 
Domestic political elites and policy makers, however, are not powerless when faced with Russian influence. As 
some scholars have argued, domestic political elites can, over time, support and amplify some existing linkages 
and diminish others. There is evidence that domestic elites in some post-Soviet states may voluntarily “borrow 
and adopt” political practices from Russia (Bader 2014: 1351). This brings us to the question of the role political 
elites play in relation to the linkages civil society actors maintain with external actors. 
 
2.1.  The role of domestic gatekeepers 
 
As Tolstrup (2013) has argued, linkages can grow or wither depending on the decision and actions of different 
sets of elites and, in particular, domestic ruling political elites playing the role of gatekeepers. Gatekeeping 
elites are in a position to condition the relationship between an external actor and domestic organizations or 
even individual citizens. Domestic ruling elites may not be able to eliminate or create all kinds of linkages, but 
they can have a substantial influence on them (Tolstrup 2013: 720-722). 
 
Following Tolstrup (2013), we expect that the current spread of Russian messages is not only dependent on 
Russia’s pull as an authoritarian gravity centre, but is, at least to some extent, channelled, amplified, and 
controlled by domestic gatekeepers. Resilience to authoritarian influences should also be considered, as shown 
by a recent study of the interaction between democratic and authoritarian diffusion processes, which found 
that regions receiving EU assistance for some time are more resistant to authoritarian tendencies (Lankina et 
                                                          
5 One example comes from Macedonia: The Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting project cited recently in 
The Guardian newspaper has revealed, based on Macedonian secret service documents, Russia’s “strong 
subversive propaganda” efforts to change Macedonia’s orientation away from the EU and NATO. The report 
details the Russian embassy’s sponsorship of over 30 Macedonian-Russian friendship organizations as well as 
the construction of Russian-style churches and building of orthodox crosses. See Harding et al. 2017. 
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al. 2016).  Based on these findings and on the discussion by Tolstrup (2013), Sasse (2016), and Hughes and 
Sasse (2016), we conceive the process of democratic and authoritarian diffusion in the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood as a competition for influence between democratizing or authoritarian external actors, by using 
economic or geopolitical leverage6 and by promoting ideas and messages to influence citizen perceptions 
(Gel’man and Lankina 2008: 44).  
 
The ability to promote discourses and messages favourable to an actor’s own point of view is an essential 
component of the soft power that we focus on. Ideas, images and narratives can influence citizen perceptions 
of what external actors do, but they can also accomplish much more than that. Messages and narratives can 
frame an actor’s position as just and morally right or as unjust or incompatible with one’s own values7. Last but 
not least, ideas and narratives can potentially influence what North et al. (2013) call “causal beliefs’—people’s 
understanding of “how the world works” (North et al. 2009: 27-28). These causal beliefs together with 
preferences and available alternatives inform people’s choices and actions. Causal beliefs are, as North et al. 
(2009) stress, the product of individual experiences, education and many other factors. In our view, the 
informational environment people are exposed to can influence their causal beliefs through complex 
mechanisms that require further study. In this paper we build on the expectation that external actors’ 
narratives can potentially influence the causal beliefs citizens hold about ‘how the world works’, which in turn 
inform their actions. 
 
Returning to the role of gatekeepers, we expect that governments and parliaments can facilitate or prevent the 
spread of the EU’s or Russia’s messages and the development of linkages, at least to some extent. We can 
expect that the current Ukrainian leadership, for example, would actively work to prevent Russian influence 
from spreading via NGOs or the Orthodox Church. The 2014 ban of 14 Russian TV channels, including Russia 
Today, introduced by the Ukrainian government, may be a harbinger of this trend. 
 
The actions of domestic gatekeeper elites, in turn, depend on their own preferences and value orientations. 
Cost-benefit calculations with regard to incentives offered by external actors and preferences over political 
institutions, specific policies and values all play a role (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005; Tolstrup 2013). Elites directly linked with Russia in ideological or value terms (e.g. President 
Igor Dodon of Moldova) or benefitting personally from economic contacts and assistance from Russia (former 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych) may act as gatekeepers restricting pro-EU linkages and supporting 
organizations affiliated or funded by Russia. With respect to the influence of political elites on the 
representation of Russia (or the EU) in the news, we do not assume that the state elites in Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine control all the content of the news. Rather, we consider the media (in this case, TV stations) as 
proxies of the elites (domestic gatekeepers) and their attitudes to the external actors. 
 
                                                          
6 We are aware of the importance of this channel of influence which will be investigated in other EU-STRAT 
research, but will be outside the scope of this paper. 
7 Examples of such a framing can be found on the state-aligned Russian TV: for instance, presenting Russia as “a 
global standard bearer for ‘traditional values’” or the West as using “double standards” in condemning Russia 
for its actions in the neighborhood, while intervening in other countries (Hutchings and Szostek 2015: 190,  
185). 




A third important aspect of the role of political elites is that they can also influence citizen perceptions of 
external actors through their own actions. If domestic elites are perceived as linked to external actors and at 
the same time are known to be corrupt, the perception of corruption may be transferred to the external actors 
they associate with. This may reflect a real connection and commitment of both actors to the same kind of 
governance or it can be a transfer of the image of the domestic actor to the external actor. For example, when 
a pro-European Moldovan government is implicated in a corruption scandal, this can easily affect the image of 
the EU itself (Jurkonis 2015). 
 
Bearing in mind these multiple channels of interaction between external actor messages and domestic 
gatekeepers, we set out to examine the current landscape of actors and organizations promoting Russian 
influence in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, with the aim to establish whether and how this landscape varies in 
the three EaP countries given the differences in the corresponding political elites’ orientations.  
 
Before turning to the overview of actors in the region and the analyses of media representations, a brief 
discussion of the content of key discourses that Russia promotes is needed in order to gain insight into the 
concepts and arguments that Russia mobilizes to legitimate its desired role (Krastev 2006: 1). 
 
2.2. Narratives, messages and the role of pro-Russian actors 
 
Russian media and affiliated outlets widely spread narratives so consistent that they should be recognized as a 
massive propaganda effort, even if they are not always based on a system of interconnected ideas like Soviet 
era ideology. Two key narratives that shed light on the ideas and messages Russia promotes through friendly 
actors and channels refer to the ‘Russian World’ and ‘sovereign democracy’. 
 
A key narrative addressing citizens in neighbouring countries has been centred around the ‘Russian World’ or 
‘Russkiy mir’ concept. This concept serves as a focus for many different actors and groups associated with 
Russia. It reflects Russia’s ambitions to be seen as a global power and as a regional power, to be consulted 
about its immediate neighbours (Frear and Mazepus 2017; Liik 2017). This geopolitical narrative is rooted in 
grievance for the loss of previous imperial greatness and demanding amends for perceived historical injustices 
especially after the end of the Cold War. The ‘Russian World’ concept appears closely related to the idea of 
‘great powerness’, a domestically salient concept that has remained a key element of Russia’s domestic identity 
building discourse (Urnov 2014). 
 
Within the narratives referring to the ‘Russian World’ concept, at least two streams can be differentiated. One 
is based on an intellectual tradition that views Russia as a distinct and self-sufficient civilization, embedded in a 
geopolitical order of traditional values, myths, spiritual demands and cultural habits, taking its inspiration from 
Berdeaev and other important Russian philosophers. Another approach focuses on the recent past and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that 25 million Russians have been displaced. This latter narrative 
provides justification for ‘reactivating’ the so-called inherited ‘Russianness’, based on language, culture, 
heritage, as a linkage with the Russian state. This narrative is built on the linear assumption that Russian 
speakers will act as Russians wherever they live. The proliferation of compatriot organizations supported by 
Russia, which we describe further in this paper, fits with this narrative. Similarly, the strategy of 
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passportization—offering Russian passports to citizens in breakaway regions in post-Soviet countries—is in line 
with the narrative of the Russkiy mir (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 468).  
 
It should be noted that narratives about Russian nationhood and Russkiy mir can be contradictory and clash 
with narratives about Eurasia (Hutchings and Szostek 2015: 191-193; Laruelle 2015b: 126-127). Russian elites 
have used the narrative of protecting Russian speakers as justification for the annexation of Crimea, which 
“unsettled countries with large Russian minorities” (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2017: 11), including the members 
of the EAEU such as Kazakhstan. Moreover, although the official documents of the Russian elites on foreign 
policy (i.e. Foreign Policy Concepts) have emphasized the Eurasian integration project, they do not explicitly 
justify the project with the idea of the Russian world (Frear and Mazepus 2017: 28). In practice any ideological 
nationalism tied to the concept of the Russian world has to co-exist with other political calculations and the 
strategic interests of a variety of domestic actors when formulating foreign policy thinking (Lankina and 
Watanabe 2017). This instrumental use of shared identity, either ethnic-linguistic or cultural-historical, reflects 
to a large extent the Russian domestic elites’ struggle to forge a national identity after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and their use of ambiguous criteria for who is considered Russian (Shevel 2011).  
 
Another narrative, centred around the concept of a ‘sovereign’ or ‘directed’ democracy, has been elevated 
from domestic audience consumption to some kind of an international Russian model of governance. As 
Krastev has argued, the discourse of sovereign democracy views sovereignty as underpinned by economic 
independence, military strength and cultural identity and embodies Russia’s ideological ambition to be an 
alternative to the EU (Krastev 2006). Sceptical as we may be about this concept’s ideological power, it has 
found resonance at least with Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who cited it as a new model of 
governance for Hungary to follow in building a strong national state (Toth 2014). A key feature of the sovereign 
democracy narrative is that it juxtaposes ‘strong’ states with the EU and the United States (U.S.), which are 
depicted as waning powers weakened by too much liberalism. The emphasis on identity and the nation as 
unifying principles link this narrative to the Russian World narrative. 
 
Russian efforts to disseminate its narratives and messages have both grown in volume and diversified beyond 
the promotion of the idea of the Russian World concept. Wilson (2015) has highlighted four different aspects of 
propaganda, aiming at different audiences: 1) efforts sowing confusion and undermining democracy abroad; 2) 
narratives nudging support for others’ anti-systemic views; 3) monopolistic propaganda for domestic viewers; 
and 4) the creation of parallel alternative realities. The last approach targets the EaP countries or, in Russian 
terms, ‘the near abroad’. Wilson (2015) stresses that the media messages in these countries are accompanied 
and reinforced by “a virtual chorus of pro-Russian parties, politicians, NGOs, media and the Church”. There is a 
clear connection, also noted by our experts, between messages and the actors we identify in the next section 
of this paper. 
 
Next to pro-Russian actors, the other key channel for spreading Russian messages and discourses is the media, 
especially television8. Russian “alternative narratives” about the recent past and current geopolitical relations 
                                                          
8 Next to television, important for older generations, we note the increasing role of social media for the spread 
of narratives undermining EU and other international organizations (especially NATO). A review of recent 
studies of narratives spread via social media can be found in Appendix 1. 




are reinforced by propaganda in the news (Wilson 2015). Television continues to be an important source for 
political news, especially for people over 35. Despite the rise of the internet as an alternative source of political 
information among the younger generations, 88 % of residents in Eastern neighbourhood countries believe 
that TV forms public opinion (Ecorys Survey Report 2016: 28). It should be noted that news editors and media 
figures in Russia have some leeway in how they construct the narratives presented in their shows, taking into 
account sub-official discourses which may not be completely aligned with Kremlin thinking (Hutchings and 
Szostek 2015: 189-190, 193). Appearances by the ideologue Alexander Dugin on Russian state television do not 
mean he is actually involved in the Russian foreign policy decision-making process (Laruelle 2015a). As such 
even state-controlled Russian news coverage, which might in turn be picked up by audiences in Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine, does not necessarily serve as a mouthpiece for a single, agreed official government 
discourse (Lankina and Watanabe 2017). 
 
Are Russian efforts to spread specific narratives and ideas and to strengthen linkages an example of 
authoritarian diffusion?9 The difference between the diffusion of authoritarianism and the diffusion of ideas 
about the importance of Russia as a global power (Frear and Mazepus 2017) may be difficult to capture 
empirically due to the overlap between nationalist and authoritarian modes of mobilization. Furthermore, in 
practice the messages and narratives spread may be very similar: for example, the negative informational 
campaign about the EU (Kintsurashvili et al. 2015: 11) can serve both objectives. In our approach here, 
therefore, we simply argue that both the density of linkages and the spread of pro-Russian and anti-EU 
messages via media increase the costs of democratization and integrating with the EU for governments in 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. 
 
 
3.  Mapping the Actors, Organizations, and Channels Promoting Russian Influence 
 
To map civil society linkages in the EaP countries, we draw on the growing literature on Russian soft power, 
propaganda and linkages. Existing studies already suggest that the universe of actors engaged in transmitting 
Russian messages is quite populous (Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012; Harding et al. 2017; Hudson 2015, 2017; 
Kłysiński and Żochowski 2016; Lutsevych 2016; Saari 2014). In addition, we identify currently relevant 
organizations and public personalities in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine drawing on country expert answers to a 
standardized questionnaire exploring different types of linkages. 
 
Our focus is on providing a current snapshot of organizations and actors involved with ideas, messages, and 
discourses originating from or related to Russia’s soft power. We concentrate on the organizations for which 
there is clear evidence of Russian funding, collaboration or orientation. 
                                                          
9 Diffusion is a term that is used extensively in a range of scholarly literature, but its meaning in the hands of 
different authors can vary significantly. Some differentiate between diffusion-as-process or diffusion-as-
outcome (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 36-37). A further area of debate is whether diffusion can be actively 
pursued through imposition or conditionality (Ambrosio 2010: 378) or whether by its very nature diffusion 
cannot be actor driven (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 38). In their widely cited conceptual framework for diffusion, 
Elkins and Simmons propose two mechanisms for the spread of policies and practices between countries (2005: 
39-45). The first is adaptation to altered conditions and the second is learning the strengths and weaknesses of 
taking certain actions by observing the experiences of others. Their first mechanism is to a certain extent 
similar to Levitsky and Way’s (2005: 22-25) international linkage. 
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The ‘agents of the Russian World’ that the literature identifies (Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012; Hudson 2015, 
2017; Kłysiński and Żochowski 2016; Lutsevych 2016; Saari 2014) include key government agencies and state 
foundations in the Russian Federation, who in turn work with trusted partners and their local associates in the 
region.  
 
Based on existing studies, the types of organizations linked with Russia can be grouped as, first, Russian 
compatriot organizations and second, organizations or groups sympathizing with the Kremlin’s agenda. For 
example, Russian-speaking communities and ethnic groups include the World Congress of Russian Compatriots, 
the International Union of Russian Compatriots and the Institute of Russian Compatriots, all of which have been 
particularly active in Ukraine (Lutsevych 2016: 14). In Belarus a Coordination Council of Heads of Russian 
Organizations, based at the Russian Embassy in Minsk, seeks to work with the Russian diaspora (Kłysiński and 
Żochowski 2016: 27). 
 
The other type of organizations sympathetic to the Kremlin’s agenda include Cossack organizations, Afghan 
veterans, paramilitary or ultra-radical groups, and even martial arts clubs (Kłysiński and Żochowski 2016: 29-32; 
Lutsevych 2016: 29-31). Next to these are educational and cultural linkages, for example through students 
attending Russian educational institutions.  
 
3.1.  Political parties 
 
Existing studies show links between parties in other parts of Europe and Russia’s ruling party, United Russia. 
United Russia has started to develop cooperation agreements with political parties in Europe that represent 
Russian minorities, e.g. in Estonia and Latvia (Hudson 2017: 32). 
 
Actors that we lack systematic evidence on, but that are clearly relevant for maintaining links with Russia are 
political parties in Moldova and Ukraine. Both formal and informal linkages exist between a number of political 
parties in the region. In Belarus these include pro-government and opposition parties. The Communist Party of 
Belarus has links with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Our experts came across information 
that implies bilateral agreements between the regime-loyal opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Belarus, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and United Russia. The smaller pro-government Republican 
Party of Labour and Justice cooperates with the Just Russia party. Finally, the opposition United Civic Party has 
a formal agreement with Russia’s opposition PARNAS Party. According to expert evidence from Moldova, two 
parliamentary parties, the Democratic Party of Moldova and the Party of Socialists of Moldova maintain ties 
with Russian partners. In addition, the anti-European, pro-Russian party Partidul Nostru (Our Party) is believed 
to have strong links to political figures in Moscow. Finally, in Ukraine the Opposition Bloc, one of the most 
prominent parties that emerged in opposition to the Euromaidan movement in 2014, is believed to have 
maintained close ties to Russia, according to local experts. 
 
Furthermore, there are connections between political parties and oligarchs that link again to Russia’s economic 
interests. Existing studies suggest there are a whole range of business and economic networks and ties 
between individuals and companies in Russia and its neighbours (Lankina and Niemczyk 2015: 107). 




   
3.2.  Oligarchs and business political ties 
 
Belarus’ predominantly state-run economy has little in the way of entrepreneurs or oligarchs independent 
from the circle around President Alexander Lukashenka. General economic ties between Russia and Belarus, 
however, are important for the Belarusian economy. There are some key economic sectors in Belarus that have 
strong business ties with the Russian Federation. These include oil refining, telecommunications, the financial 
sector, retailers, metal production and automobiles. 
 
In Moldova a number of wealthy businessmen, many of whom are also involved in politics, are believed to 
have fortunes in Russia (among other countries). It is, however, difficult to assess what businesses they control 
because of their frequent use of intermediaries (Leitner and Meissner 2017: 123). These intermediaries include 
some of the richest men in Moldova, such as Vlad Plahotniuk (Andreev 2015), Anatol Stati, and the mayor of 
Balti, Renato Usatai, who lived in Russia for over a decade (RIA 2015). Other wealthy individuals, like Nicolae 
Ciornâi (Infotag 2010) and Constantin Tampiza, have links to Russia’s Lukoil (Riseblog 2015).  
 
In Ukraine “closely networked interests” could be observed under President Yanukovych in sectors such as oil 
and gas, financial services, telecommunications and mass media (Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012: 6). 
Prominent oligarchs such as Victor Medvedchuk, Rinat Akhmetov, Yuriy Boyko and Victor Pinchuk are often 
cited as maintaining close links to Russia. 
 
3.3.  Cultural and educational umbrella organizations  
 
The main Russian sponsored agencies and foundations active in the region are Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir 
Foundation, and the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy (Hudson 2017: 30-31; Lutsevych 2016: 10-11; 
Saari 2014: 60-62). These agents often provide grants and funds for third-party organizations and proxy groups. 
In turn, these can seek to support, strengthen or exploit Russia’s technocratic linkages, social linkages, 
information linkages and civil society linkages. These instruments are sometimes referred to as “vertically 
integrated propaganda networks” (Lankina and Niemczyk 2015: 105). 
 
The Russkiy Mir Foundation and Rosstrudnichestvo have opened a number of centres with the declared aim to 
promote education and culture, the Russian language and the Russian World, as well as to support compatriots 
in the EaP countries. The Russkiy Mir Foundation has a centre at Brest State University in Belarus and a further 
four at Moldovan universities in Chișinău, Bălți, Tiraspol and Komrat. There are still 11 centres in Ukraine, 
mainly in the east and south of the country, but also in the capital Kyiv. Of those, three are in the conflict-zone 
territories of Donbas. Rosstrudnichestvo has a Centre for Science and Culture in the Moldovan capital as well 
and a further four centres in Belarus in Minsk, Brest and Homel. Ukraine still hosts a Centre for Science and 
Culture in Kyiv, and there is also representation via a Consulate-General of Russia in Odessa. The Minsk agency 
of the Russian state-owned Moscow Centre of International Co-operation—‘Moscow House’—has become an 
informal soft power coordination centre in Belarus (Kłysiński and Żochowski 2016: 28-29). 
 
There are a wide range of possible agents of Russian influence at work, including government-organized NGOs, 
non-profit civil society organizations, proxy groups and networks. In addition to the large official Russian bodies 
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that operate in the EaP countries, there are numerous associations and local civil society organizations which 
often collaborate with them and others to promote and promulgate Russian interests. Examples of specific 
organizations and their areas of activity identified by experts in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine can be found in 
Table 1.  
 
In all three countries there is also some form of coordinating council for Russian compatriots, the loose term 
for ethnic Russians, Russian citizens and Russian speakers living outside the borders of the Russian Federation. 
These congresses or councils usually have close ties to the local Russian Embassy.  
 
Transnational youth groups are often funded by Russian grants from Kremlin-approved foundations and 
agencies. Examples include the Eurasian Youth Movement, Young Eurasia or Sodruzhestvo (Lutsevych 2016: 22-
23). Youth movements might actively promote Russian World values, such as Young Russia in Belarus (Kłysiński 
and Żochowski 2016: 27-28).  
 
In addition, a variety of groups supporting Eurasian integration have emerged, and often at the same time 
promote an anti-EU narrative. These can address audiences in specific countries, such as the Recognition 
Foundation in Moldova, or they can work with local actors, such as Viktor Medvedchuk in Ukraine and his anti-
EU NGO Ukrainian Choice (Lutsevych 2016: 20-22). In Belarus there are also organizations that promote 
Russian-Belarusian unity in particular. Table 1 presents an (non-exhaustive) overview10. In the majority of cases, 
there is a lack of transparency about where the grants and funds of these organizations originate from. Many 
websites include a list of links to ‘Partners’, but the nature of the partnership is usually not clear. In many cases, 
these partners are local Russian Embassies, and local offices of the Russkiy Mir Foundation and 
Rosstrudnichestvo. One interesting example of a complicated network of connections can be found in Moldova. 
The League of Russian Youth from Moldova states on their home page that they receive no funding from Russia 
or other nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The head of the League is Igor Tulyantsev, 
who is also the founder of the local Community Fund, which provides grants to organizations in Moldova. This 
includes grants to the League of Russian Youth from Moldova. The Community Fund lists as its partners the 
Russkiy Mir Foundation and the Russian Embassy in Moldova, but the nature of that partnership is not 
disclosed. 
                                                          
10 Web links have been included where available. 




Table 1: Key Groups Promoting Russian Influence Active in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
A. Belarus    
Name Area of Activity Web Site 
Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Belarus (Координационный совет 
Российских соотечественников в Белоруссии) 
Compatriots, Russian World http://ross-bel.ru/koordinacionnyy-sovet-
rossiyskih-so   
National-Liberation Movement in Belarus (Национально-освободительное движение в 
Беларуси) 
Compatriots, Russian World http://belnod.by  
Russian Comradeship (Русское товарищество) Compatriots, Russian World n/a 
Russian Society (РОО «Русское общество»)  http://www.rusobel.org  
Young Rus’ (Русь молодая) Slavic values, military-patriotic, sport 
trainings   
http://rumol.by  
Transfiguration (Преображение) Culture and education, youth, Russian 
language, Russian-Belarusian Unity 
n/a 
Our Rus’ (Наша Русь) Culture, language, Russian language, 
history, religion 
n/a 
Rus’ United (Русь единая) Culture, history, Eurasian integration, 
Slavic world   
n/a 
Sadko (Садко) Culture, language, compatriots, 
Russian-Belarusian relations , 
pensioners 
n/a 
Belarusian Union of Survivors of Siege of Leningrad blokadniki  (Белорусский союз 
блокадников Ленинград 
Culture and education, history n/a 
Russian House in Vitebsk (ВОО «Русский дом») Culture, language, compatriots, 
Russian-Belarusian relations   
http://vitrusdom.narod.ru  
Russian Cultural Centre Rus’ in Vitebsk (Русский культурный центр «Русь») Education and culture, compatriots, 
Russian-language 
n/a 
Russian Cultural and Educational Society in Mogilev (Русское культурно-
просветительское общество в Могилеве) 
Culture, youth, symbolic events http://rkpo.ucoz.ru  
International organization of youth organizations of Russian compatriots Culture and education, youth, Russian http://www.mamors.ru  
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(Международная ассоциация молодежных организаций российских 
соотечественников -МАМОРС) 
language, history 
Belarusian civic organization Rus’ (Белорусское общественное объединение «Русь») Russians in Belarus n/a 
Belarusian Literary Union Polotsk Branch (Белорусский литературный союз «Полоцкая 
ветвь») 
Culture, literature, Russian language https://polvetvby.wordpress.com  
 
B. Moldova    
Name Area of Activity Web Site 
Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Moldova (Координационный 
совет российских соотечественников в Республике Молдова) 
Compatriots, Russian World https://russkie.md  
Congress of Russian Communities of Moldova (Конгресса русских общин 
Республики Молдова) 
Compatriots, Russian World http://krorm.ru  
Community Fund (Фонд Содружество) Compatriots, Eurasian integration http://fond.md  
Russian Community of the Republic of Moldova (Русская община Республики 
Молдова) 
Russian World, Russian language and 
culture, Russian-speaking communities 
http://rusmoldova.org  
League of Russian Youth from Moldova (Лига русской молодежи Республики 
Молдова) 
Compatriots, Russian World, youth 
groups 
http://ligarus.org  
Young Guard (Молодая Гвардия) Transnational youth group, joining 
Eurasian Union 
http://gardatinara.md  
Women’s Association Rossiyanka (Ассоциация женщин Россиянка) - n/a 
Centre for Russian Culture in Moldova (Центр русской культуры в Республике 
Молдова) 
Russian World, Russian language and 
culture, Russian-speaking communities 
http://ow.ly/Aa9L30cewSO  
Association of Russian Artists from Moldova (Товарищество Русских 
Художников Молдовы) 
Russian World, Russian language and 
culture 
http://moldovart.com  
Association of Russian Writers from Moldova (Ассоциация Русских Писателей 
Республики Молдова) 
Compatriots, Russian World, Russian 
language and culture 
https://www.facebook.com/arprmofficial/  
Spiritual Russian Unity Movement (Движение «Русское духовное единство») Russian World, promoting  Russian 
language and culture 
https://russkie.md/category/russkoe-duhovnoie-
edinstvo/  




RUSI NGO Russian World, Russian culture  








Name Area of Activity Web Site 
All-Ukraine Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriot Organizations 
(Всеукраинский Координационный Совет организаций российских 
соотечественников) 
Compatriots, Russian World http://www.vksors.org 
NGO Ukrainian Choice (Украинский выбор) Anti-EU http://vybor.ua 
NGO Russian School (Русская школа) Education and culture, compatriots, 
Russian-language, youth and sports 
http://www.schoolru.com.ua  
Kyiv Centre for Policy Research and Conflictology Policy research http://www.analitik.org.ua 
Source: Authors
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3.4. The Russian Orthodox Church 
 
An actor that deserves special attention due to its importance as a channel for political influence and increasing 
reach is the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).11 A recent survey has shown that there is a link between the self-
identification as a member of the Orthodox Church and support for Russia’s role in the world as a 
‘counterweight’ to the West in Central and Eastern Europe. The exception to this trend are citizens in Georgia 
and Ukraine (Pew Research Centre 2017).  
 
The ROC is an important patron for initiatives aiming to link Orthodox Christians across Eastern Europe and to 
promote ideas of common identity. The Pew Survey quoted above showed that Russia was viewed as a 
protector of Orthodox Christians in the world by a majority of citizens of countries where orthodox religion was 
dominant. In Belarus, 76 % of citizens agreed with the statement that a strong Russia was needed to 
counterbalance the West, and in Moldova, 61 % agreed with the same statement. While only 22 % of 
Ukrainians agreed with the statement, the majority of those who agreed self-identified as Eastern Orthodox. 
The two most salient factors predicting support for Russia’s strong role in the world were the Orthodox religion 
and the belief that the respondent’s values differ from Western values. 
 
According to some studies, while the ROC promotes a Russian cultural outlook, it does not always support the 
Kremlin’s political position (Hudson 2017: 31; Petro 2015). In Moldova’s latest elections, however, the branch 
of the Orthodox Church affiliated with the Moscow patriarchate took an overly political stance, conducting an 
aggressive campaign against pro-EU candidates. 
 
The Church supports its own international events such as the Day of Baptism of Rus’ or organizations such as 
the charities of the so-called ‘Orthodox oligarchs’: the Foundation of St. Vasily or the Dialogue of Civilizations 
Endowment (Lutsevych 2016: 24-25). Some well-known public figures from the Orthodox Church have spread 
anti-EU rhetoric in Belarus and Moldova (Całus 2016: 69-70). Examples of such figures in Moldova are the 
bishop of Bălți, Marchel Mihaescu, or the priest and chair of the St. Matrona Christian Association, Anatolie 
Cibric. Moreover, the president of Moldova, Igor Dodon, decorated sixteen priests of the Orthodox 
Metropolitan Church of Moldova in July 2017 (Hendrik 2017) and has met with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and 
All Russia four times since the beginning of his presidency during his official visits to Russia (The Russian 
Orthodox Church 2017). In Belarus the Metropolit Pavel of Minsk and Slutsk is also active in promoting 
‘traditional’ values and organizing events such as the festival on Linii Stalina in 2015 and the youth educational 
forum Quo Vadis in 2016. The Belarusian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has been operating a 
number of so-called Orthodox military-patriotic clubs for many years (Kłysiński and Żochowski 2016: 32-33). 
Orthodox military patriotic clubs such as Druzjyna, Slavyane and Vitjaz are developed in the Grodno region of 
Belarus.  
 
                                                          
11 Not all Eastern Orthodox Christians in the region are part of the ROC under the lead of the Moscow 
Patriarchate. In Ukraine, for example, there are three different denominations of Eastern Christianity: the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate and the 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012: 11-13). 
 




In Ukraine, it is important to distinguish between the positions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church affiliated 
with the Moscow Patriarchate, which tends to be pro-Russian, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, which is not recognized by the Moscow Patriarchate and is not pro-Russian. NGOs such as 
Orthodox Ukraine carry out youth and education projects with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (affiliated to the 
Moscow Patriarchate).  
 
The comparison between the role of the ROC in the three countries suggests that the church plays a politically 
salient and pro-Moscow role in both Belarus and Moldova. The military patriotic clubs organized in Belarus by 
the church are evidence that the church itself creates actors that promote pro-Russian ideas, for example the 
idea of the common Slavic roots. In Ukraine, the influence of the Russian affiliated branch of orthodoxy seems 
to be currently diminishing.  
 
3.5.  Educational linkages 
 
Higher education institutions in the Russian Federation are currently a popular destination for many students 
from EaP countries. Both Belarus and Moldova sent nearly 25,000 students each to study at Russian 
universities in 2014. The figures are lower for Ukraine: in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and the annexation 
of Crimea, Russia was the chosen destination for nearly 13,000 students from Ukraine. The number of 
Ukrainian citizens studying in Russian universities excluding the ones from Crimea is around 9,000. These make 
up approximately 15 % of the total number of Ukrainian students abroad, and represent 7 % of the foreign 
students studying in the Russian Federation. Remarkably, the number of Ukrainian students in the Russian 
Federation has actually increased almost by a third over the last two years. Such an increase is presumably 
caused by students coming from the conflict-zone territories of Donbas. 
 
As the student numbers show, the situation in Ukraine stands out in the education field with its changing 
dynamics. There were multiple branches of Russian educational institutions in Crimea even before its 
annexation. However, currently there are no branches of Russian higher education institutions operating on 
Ukrainian territory that is controlled by the Ukrainian government. 
 
By contrast, a number of Russian higher education institutions have opened branches in Belarus and Moldova. 
There are three in Belarus, with the Belarusian-Russian University in the regional city of Mahileu/Mogilev 
having a particularly good reputation dating back to Soviet times. The branches of the Russian State Social 
University and Russian University of Economics in Minsk are less well-known. Six branches operate in Moldova. 
Moscow’s Modern University for the Humanities has centres in Chișinău and Beltsy. There is also a branch of 
the Baltic Institute of Ecology, Politics and Law in Beltsy. The Slavonic University in Chișinău includes the 
Lyceum Svetochi. Finally, there are two branches of Russian universities in Tiraspol, the capital of breakaway 
Transnistria: the Moscow Institute of Entrepreneurship and Law and the Moscow Academy of Economics and 
Law. These are actual branches of universities, which offer access to their courses, rather than institutes set up 
with the specific purpose to promote the ‘Russian World’. Nevertheless, they play a socializing function, just 
like their Western counterparts and can informally diffuse narratives on Russian ideas and values. In addition, 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation has opened centres based in local universities in each country with the express 
purpose of promoting the Russian language, education and culture. 
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The overview of linkages presented in this section and the examples of politically salient actions of pro-Russian 
actors and organizations appears to strengthen the existing interpretation of these actors as tools of Russian 
soft power. Coverage of organizations linked to Russia is also starting to become more prominent in the local 
media of EaP countries, reflecting both a potential intensification of these organizations’ activities, but also the 
increased awareness of their role in the region since the start of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. 
 
The (non-exhaustive) overview of linkages presented in this section also confirms our initial expectations that 
the landscape of organizations and actors would be influenced by the choices of gatekeeper political elites. In 
other words, domestic gatekeepers can to some extent prevent (as in the case of Ukraine), moderate, or 
enhance the influence of the Russian actors. The comparison between the actors and organizations active in 
the three countries reveals not only the downward trend in Ukraine, but also the density of organizations and 
actors linked to Russia in Moldova. Based on our discussion in the first part of this paper, we find that the 
abundance and diversity of linkages suggests both external interest to change political dynamics and choices in 
Moldova and the resonance with some Moldovan political elites. This abundance is very visible in both the 
business, cultural, and religious spheres and is enhanced by various competing groups in Moldova. In Belarus, 
the cultural and religious links are visible and appear stable for the last few years, whereas the business links 
seem much more covert and moderated by Lukashenka’s government.  
 
In addition to the support or even the creation of local actors favourable to Russia, the media has been playing 
a significant role in spreading Russian messages targeting ‘the West’ as morally corrupt and weak. The news 
and perspectives promoted by Russian state-controlled TV have been a key element in spreading Russian 
influence (Lankina and Niemczyk 2014). What is less understood is the extent to which Russia’s narratives and 
the image it wants to project are reflected by national media in EaP countries, a gap which we address in the 
analysis presented here. 
 
 
4.  Russia and the EU in the (National) News: A Three-Country Comparison 
 
There is a separate and increasing set of Russian informational linkages based on media, including film, TV 
series and TV news. In Belarus and Moldova there is direct access to Russian media or repackaged reporting on 
local news drawing on Russian news agencies. In Belarus, for example, 90 % of the public is reported to watch 
Russian TV (Wilson 2015). Local branches of media projects such as Sputnik have the budget to attract quality 
local journalists from state and independent media (Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012: 8-10; Kłysiński and 
Żochowski 2016: 34-37). 
 
A growing area of analysis concerns the spread of fake news and propaganda originating from Russia and 
targeting the EU member states or the EaP countries (Nimmo 2016; Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014; Potapova 
2017). Analysing the spread of fake news and the reach of Russian propaganda is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the importance of their increase should not be underestimated12. Think tanks, journalists and 
experts are increasingly monitoring propaganda and fake news and capturing the underlying narratives. 
Monitoring propaganda and fake news has uncovered their staggering scope, leading to calls by concerned 
                                                          
12 In recognition of the importance of this phenomenon, we provide an overview of some of the monitoring 
organizations and initiatives dealing with fake news in Appendix 1. 




experts and members of the European Parliament for an increase of the budget and staff of the EU’s EastStrat 
Com, the European External Service agency dealing with Russian disinformation (Bentzen 2017). 
 
The EU features prominently in key narratives, being described as “weak and morally decaying” (Bentzen 
2017). Recent research by the Wilfrid Martens Centre for European Studies shows that the Kremlin 
systematically spreads negative narratives about the EU to shape the opinion of the Russian speakers. The main 
narratives about the EU summarized in their study depict the EU as an aggressive and expansionist enemy, as a 
weak union that cannot deal with global challenges, and as a union lacking moral values (Potapova 2017). The 
content of narratives is as pernicious as the framing of messages, combining, in the words of Pomerantzev and 
Weiss (2014): “Soviet-era ‘whataboutism’ and Chekist ‘active measures’ with a wised-up, post-modern smirk 
that says everything is a sham”.  
 
Russia’s investments into media and communications have been shown to cover three main areas: internally 
and externally focused media with a substantial online presence, use of social media, and discussion boards 
and language skills to engage target audiences (Giles 2015). In both Belarus and Moldova there are local 
editions of the Sputnik news portal, NTV and RTR television channels, the TASS news agency, as well as the 
newspapers Argumenty i Fakty and Komosomolskaya Pravda. In Ukraine local versions of various Russian news 
outlets have been banned since 2014.13 Even the independent online Russian TV station ‘Dozhd’, which is no 
cheerleader for Putin’s government, was banned in Ukraine in 2017.  
 
In Belarus, there are also local branches of the Interfax and REGNUM news agencies. In Moldova, there are 
local versions of the Russian TV stations RenTV and STS. In addition, a feature of the information market in 
Moldova is the repackaging of material from Russia for Moldovan news channels. These include the 
newspapers United Gagauzia, Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie and Trud, the news agencies Interlink and Infotag, 
and the web portal Russian TV of Moldova. Across the region there are also news sources which do not just 
repackage Russian news or have formal connections to Russian partners, but still take a pro-Russian stance. 
Examples include the online portals https://imhoclub.by and zapadrus.su in Belarus as well as the newspaper 
Vesti in Ukraine. 
 
Importantly, Russian information sources are very popular in Belarus and Moldova, where 91 % and 90 % of 
respondents respectively indicated their use. Russian TV channels are cited as the main source for news and 
current affairs programmes by 37 % of respondents in Belarus and 38 % in Moldova (Ecorys Annual Survey 
Report 2016). A project supported by the EaP civil society forum monitored news on the Russian channels 
watched in EaP countries in 201514. They found, not surprisingly, that the role of Russian channels as sources of 
information was more significant in the countries where they were freely available (Belarus, Moldova) than in 
countries where they were not (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine). On the general trend and tone of Russian 
channels, the study noted, as could be expected, the extremely limited range of topics and biased 
interpretations offered on Russian channels. For example, regarding Ukraine, the study found that “the main 
                                                          
13 Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine changed its name to ‘KP’ in 2016 in response to the decommunization 
laws. While it typically takes a pro-Russia stance, it no longer has official ties to Russia.   
14An executive summary can be found via the memo 98 website: 
http://memo98.sk/uploads/content_galleries/source/memo/russia/executive-summary-and-
recommendations.pdf 
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Russian channels have been used as instruments of propaganda in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, 
diverting attention from important domestic issues and challenges and instead focusing on the conflict in 
Ukraine” (Monitoring report executive summary, 2015: 3). 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of Russian channels, national TV and media play an important role in opinion 
formation as they may be seen as more objective. National TV news are an important source of political news 
for the public in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. According to the Ecorys Annual Survey Report (2016), private 
and public TV stations are the most popular sources of national political news for 50 % of respondents in 
Belarus, for 56 % of respondents in Moldova, and for 62 % in Ukraine. However, there is no large private TV 
landscape in Belarus. Moreover, people from the EaP countries that have heard news about the EU, are most 
likely to have heard it on TV (81 % of respondents). 
 
 
5.  TV-Monitoring: Russia and the EU in the National Evening News 
 
5.1. The objectives 
 
For the analyses of Russia and the EU in local media in the three countries, we have focused on Belarusian, 
Moldovan, and Ukrainian TV stations with wide viewership. The media can be seen as proxies for political 
elites, who, as argued above, can act as gatekeepers filtering messages by different external actors. Therefore, 
we find domestic TV news a suitable departure point for our empirical investigation of the penetration of 
Russian messages and narratives in the societies in the EaP countries.  
 
The major goal of the media monitoring and analysis presented in the second part of this paper is to provide 
not only a comprehensive picture of the news about Russia and the EAEU, but also of the view of the EU and its 
member states that regular people in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine are exposed to. We aim to identify the 
extent, tone, and type of coverage of Russia in the main evening news bulletins in the most watched TV 
stations. As argued above, democratization can be hampered not only by spreading pro-Russian messages, but 
also by undermining the democratizing actor in the region—the EU. For this reason, we look at the proportion 
of news devoted to Russia and to the EU, as well as the type and the tone of these messages. Furthermore, the 
potential tone or bias in news items about Russia or other external actors such as the EU may also resonate 
with existing discourses or, adversely, suggest a different world view. Exploring how Russia and the EU are 
presented in terms of tone in national news would further enhance our understanding of the informational 




In each country, we covered the main evening news programme of the most popular TV stations (two TV 
stations in Ukraine and Belarus, and three in Moldova).15 The choice of channels to be monitored was driven by 
evidence about the most popular TV channels, where available, and by some country specific considerations. 
                                                          
15 When possible, the versions of the news programmes that were actually aired were used for coding (rather 
than recordings made available after the actual emissions).  
 




Based on the results of the 2016 Ecorys Survey Report, we know that private channels are considered an 
important and objective news source in Ukraine. In both Moldova and Ukraine, private channels are considered 
as more trustworthy sources of information on political matters, in contrast to Belarus where people rely on 
public channels. 
 
The two largest TV channels in Belarus are the state-run Belarus 1 and ONT. The levels of viewership of these 
programmes are not openly available, but since most Belarusians watch public TV as a source of political news, 
we assume that these programmes are the most watched news programmes. According to a recent report by 
Litvinovich et al. (2014: 15-16), for an average Belarusian, TV is the second most important source of 
information after friends, family, and colleagues. Although in the last years the Internet becomes more popular 
amongst the younger age group as a source of information about life in Belarus and abroad, almost 70 % of the 
youth (younger than 30) use TV for this purpose as well. Therefore we have monitored the evening news 
programme of the state-run TV station Belarus 1 called Panorama and two news programmes of the state-
owned TV station Obshchenatsional'noe Televidenie (ОNТ). Vremya is directly pulled from Russia’s First TV 
channel and shown right before the locally-produced Nashi Novosti on ONT. All Belarusian news programmes 
are in Russian with just some rare pieces (mostly about culture, history) in Belarusian.  
  
In Ukraine, we monitored the main evening bulletin Novini on the state-run First National TV station and the 
main evening bulletin TSN on the privately-owned 1+1 TV station.  
 
In Moldova, we covered one news bulletin Primele Stiri on the Russian-language TV station Prime TV (the most 
watched TV station in Moldova with 56 % viewership), one evening news bulletin Stiri and/or Mesager on the 
Romanian-language public station Moldova 1 (the second most popular TV station with 45 % viewership) and 
one evening news bulletin Stirile Pro TV on the Romanian-language private TV station Pro TV Chisinau (33 % 
viewership). 
 
The period of news monitoring ran for four months from 16 January 2017 to 15 May 2017. Coders based in 
each country (two in Belarus, one in Moldova, and one in Ukraine) watched and coded the evening news 
programs six days a week and skipped a different day every week, where possible. This sampling strategy was 
designed to address the possible bias that important focusing events can have on assessing typical coverage. 
 
We have monitored and coded 607 news emissions (194 in Belarus, 238 in Moldova, and 175 in Ukraine). The 
total duration of the monitored emissions is 377 hours (130 in Belarus, 115 in Moldova, and 132 in Ukraine). 
Table 2 shows the distribution of number and duration of news emissions watched per country and news 
channel. We have coded all news items in which Russia, the EAEU, the EU, or the member states of the EU 
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Table 2. Number and duration of monitored news broadcasts across countries, channels, and programmes. 
Country Channel Owner Programme Language Number Duration 
Belarus Belarus1 State/Public Panorama Russian 79 59 hours 
   Glavny Efir Russian 9 12 hours 
 ONT State/Public Nashi Novostii Russian 53 27 hours 
   Vremya Russian 42 20 hours 
   Kontury Russian 11 12 hours 
Moldova Prime TV Private Primele Stiri Russian 61 19 hours 
 Moldova 1 State/Public Stiri Romanian 76 22 hours 
 Pro TV  Private Stirile Pro TV Romanian 101 74 hours 
Ukraine First National State/Public Novini Ukrainian 82 41 hours 
 1+1 TV Private TSN Ukrainian 93 91 hours 
3 countries 7 channels 2 types 12 programmes 3 languages 607 em-s 377 hours 
Source: Authors 
Note: In Belarus apart from regular evening programmes, there are several news programmes with different names. Glavny 
Efir is the news programme broadcasted on Sundays on Belarus 1. Kontury is a weekly overview of news on ONT on 
Sundays. In Moldova, Stiri and Mesager are the regular evening news programmes on Moldova 1. 
 
5.3. Extent of coverage  
 
The number of the relevant international news items varies per TV station in each country as can be seen from 
Table 2. In Belarus, the main state channel Belarus 1 has broadcasted 364 news items that were about Russia 
or the EAEU and the EU and/or its member states (in total 12.8 h of material). By comparison, ONT, the other 
state-owned TV, broadcasted 120 news items (4.3 h). The other 138 news items were broadcasted in the 
programmes originating from Russia (8.1 h). 
 
Privately-owned TV channels have shown more international news, mentioning both Russia and the EU in 
Ukraine and Moldova. In Moldova, the private (Romanian language) channel Pro-TV broadcasted much more 
international news mentioning the relevant actors (471 items, 13.6 h) than the public channel TV Moldova 1 
(169 items, 4.8 h), and also in comparison to the Russian language Prime TV (127 items, 3.1 h). Similarly, in 
Ukraine the private TV 1+1 broadcasted more than twice as many international news items (244 items, 10.8 h) 
as the public TV First National (172 items, 4 h). 
 
The share of news mentioning Russia as a main actor is similar in all three countries (based on our sampling of 
stations and programmes): in Belarus 36 %, Moldova 30 %, and Ukraine 37 % of all news feature Russia. It is 
larger than the share of news devoted to the EU as a main actor, but less than the combined news featuring 
any of the EU member states.16 It is noteworthy that in more than 10 % of the news items featuring Russia, it is 
presented alongside either the EU or one of the member states. But also, when the EU is discussed as a main 
actor, more than 15 % of the time Russia is mentioned as well. When taking into account any mention of Russia 
in a news item (as a main or secondary actor), it features in 41 % (Belarus), 35 % (Moldova), and 53 % (Ukraine) 
of coded news items. Russia’s integration project, the EAEU, receives minimal coverage: small in Belarus (6 %), 
non-existent in Ukraine (0 %).  
                                                          
16 We count mentions of EU member states even when they are mentioned on their own and not in their 
capacity as members of the EU or in connection to European integration. 





The importance of the relations with a given actor can also be indicated in the news programme by introducing 
a news story about said actor in the lead at the beginning of the programme. Russia was in the leading news 
item of a given programme 84 times in Belarus, 28 in Moldova, and 43 in Ukraine (38 % of Russian mentions in 
Belarus are the leading news item, compared to only 12 % in Moldova). The EU on its own has been mentioned 
in the lead less often than Russia, but the EU member states and the EU counted together have been 
mentioned in the lead more often than Russia in Ukraine and Moldova. This overview of TV coverage shows 
that although Russia is mentioned more frequently on the monitored stations than the EU, in total there is 




To gain an idea of how the selected news channels present Russia and the EU, we evaluated not only know how 
much airtime the external actors get, but also in what light they are presented. To analyse this, coders 
evaluated the tone of the news items, choosing between neutral or an explicit or implicit evaluation tone. The 
tone could be negative, positive, or balanced. The tone was coded as negative if the news item either explicitly 
or implicitly created a negative image of the actor. The tone was coded as positive if the news item created a 
positive image of an actor. We counted the tone as balanced when both positive and negative sides of the 
actors or events were discussed. 
 
In Belarus, very few items had a tone: less than half of the news items that feature Russia have either implicit 
or explicit tone. In Moldova, the number of news items with a tone is the highest: almost two thirds of the 
news items about Russia have a tone. In Ukraine more than half of news items about Russia contain an 
evaluation.  
 
Taking messages from all countries together, when a news item about the EU had a tone, it was most often 
positive (62 % of all messages that had a tone). Correspondingly, 26 % of messages were balanced and 12 % 
were negative. By comparison, when a news item about Russia had a tone, it was most often negative: 50% of 
all messages that had an evaluative tone, while 16 % of messages were balanced and 34 % were positive. The 
distribution of tone, however, varied per country (Figure 1). 
 
In Belarus, the largest number of items that had a tone—82 (74%)—presented Russia in a positive light, nine 
news items were balanced (8 %), and twenty negative (18 %). In Moldova, negative messages about Russia 
dominated with 86 items (46 % of items), 49 were balanced (26 % of items), and 53 were positive (28 % of 
items). Strikingly, reflecting the current tensions with Russia, in Ukraine almost all news items about Russia that 
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Figure 1. Evaluations of the EU and Russia in news items in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (percentage of all the 




There are cross-country and within-country differences in how the TV channels present Russia and the EU. In 
Belarus, both TV channels and their programmes are mostly positive about Russia. Noticeably, the exception 
was the weekly programme Kontury on ONT, which put a more negative emphasis on Russian sanctions against 
Belarusian products and towards some Russian officials. At the same time, the programmes (re)broadcasted 
from Russian TV are less likely to be positive about the EU than the Belarusian programmes. In Moldova, 
Russia-related news on the state channel is mostly balanced, while on the private channels negatively-toned 
news about Russia outnumbers positive ones. EU-related news is prevailingly positive on private Prime TV and 
state Moldova 1, and mostly balanced or positive on PRO TV. In Ukraine, both stations are completely negative 
about Russia and most of the news items about the EU have no tone. 
 
5.5. Themes and sources of news 
 
The TV monitoring yielded interesting results in terms of information about the topics and themes covered in 
the news items about Russia and the EU and its member states. In Belarus, most news about Russia is related 
to external events or developments, followed by bilateral relations and programmes, and then meetings, 
conferences, and events. In Moldova, there is a more even spread, with a relatively large amount devoted to 
human interest stories. In Ukraine, Russian-related news is dominated by external events or developments and 
bilateral relations and programmes. 
 
The distribution of topics for the news items about the EU and its member states in Belarus and Ukraine is 
exactly the same as that of the news items about Russia: external events or developments and bilateral 
relations and programmes. In Moldova, bilateral relations, meetings and conferences dominate as the topics of 
news items about the EU and its member states. 
 
After identifying the general topic of each news item, the coders could assign more than one specific theme to 
a news item (see Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C). Overall, the top two themes in each country included international 




relations—information about international meetings, councils of the EU, and international agreements, and 
security—including information about wars and terrorism. The third most frequent theme in Moldova and 
Ukraine was the category that included themes not listed below (other). Belarus was the only country in which 
the economy was the third most frequent theme of the news items. 
 
The distribution of themes per actor (EU, EAEU, Russia, or EU member states) and country shows interesting 
patterns as well.  
 
Table 3A. Topics of news items in Belarus per actor.17 
Actor MS&EU MS Russia EAEU EU Total 
Culture 1 28 24 2 0 55 
Economy 20 41 68 18 7 154 
Energy 2 4 30 3 0 39 
Environment 0 3 3 0 0 6 
History 3 23 19 0 0 45 
Immigration 13 30 10 0 8 61 
International 29 55 98 13 13 208 
Other 8 45 45 1 2 101 
Political 30 78 6 1 7 122 
Reforms 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Rule of law 0 15 12 1 1 29 
Security 21 102 100 7 11 241 
Values 5 41 25 1 4 76 
Total news items 70 (11 %) 283 (45 %) 221 (36 %) 19 (3 %) 29 (5 %) 622 (100 %) 
Source: Authors 
 
In Belarus (Table 3A), individual EU member states were most often mentioned in news items about security. 
Items on security included very diverse subjects, from information about Germany’s defence spending, through 
to the arrival of new NATO corps from Belgium in Lithuania, to a terrorist attack in Sweden. EU member states 
were mentioned in security-themed news items 102 times, slightly more often than Russia—100 times. In the 
Russian case, security items gave information, for example, about joint military training by Russian and Tajik 
military forces, an attack on police in Astrakhan, the situation in Syria and humanitarian actions by the Russian 
army, and the investigation of the terrorist attack in St. Petersburg.  
 
In the Belarusian news, Russia and the EAEU were mentioned more often in the context of economy (86) than 
the EU, the EU member states individually, and the EU member states as a part of the EU taken together (68). 
The EU was most often mentioned in the context of international relations (events, meetings, and agreements), 
security, and immigration. There was a substantial share of news items in which either a EU member state 
individually or as a part of the EU was discussed in relation to political and institutional themes, examples of 
                                                          
17 In Tables 3A, 3B, And 3C, ‘MS&EU’ stands for member states mentioned in the context of the EU, ‘MS’ stands 
for member states, and ‘EAEU’ for Eurasian Economic Union. 
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which are the elections in the Netherlands and France, the legalization of euthanasia in Germany, or plans for 
the new design for British passports after Brexit. 
 
Table 3B. Topics of news items in Moldova per actor. 
Actor MS&EU MS Russia EAEU EU Total 
Culture 3 73 26 0 6 108 
Economy 4 45 21 1 24 95 
Energy 3 7 4 1 6 21 
Environment 1 3 2 0 1 7 
History 2 9 31 0 4 46 
Immigration 1 19 15 0 4 39 
International 8 32 48 10 32 130 
Other 5 169 67 0 14 255 
Political 7 27 11 1 20 66 
Reforms 6 21 1 0 68 96 
Rule of law 1 46 24 0 11 82 
Security 3 76 73 1 13 166 
Values 4 56 41 0 21 122 
Total news items 27 (4 %) 382 (50 %) 228 (30 %) 10 (1 %) 120 (16 %) 767 (100 %) 
Source: Authors 
 
In Moldova (Table 3B), the patterns are different. The EU is reported most frequently in the context of reforms 
linked to the Association Agreements. Examples of such news items include reports on progress in the 
implementation of the Association Agreements, the provision of 15 million euros by the EU for the reform of 
public administration in Moldova, and the harmonization of Moldovan legislation with European standards in 
foods commerce. The second group of news items in which the EU features as the main actor is related to 
international relations. Importantly, the EU is also present in the news on economic themes in Moldova. The EU 
is mentioned more often (24 cases) than Russia (21 cases) in economic news items. Furthermore, when 
including the EU, the EU member states individually, and the EU member states as a part of the EU, there are 
73 news items in relation to economic issues: substantially more in comparison to the 22 news items about the 
economy involving Russia or the EAEU. The economic context in which the EU was presented in the news 
programmes is, for example, support for small enterprises that were opened and developed thanks to 
European grants, the EU as the buyer of 77 % of Moldovan wine exports, and Germany’s interest in 
investments in Moldova. Interestingly, the third most frequent context in which individual member states 
feature is culture: arts, popular culture, and specific regional/national customs (73). Several examples of items 
about culture that include EU member states are: the celebration of St. Anton in Spain, a Bulgarian masks 
festival, the Belgian Chocolate Saloon, a dance contest in Romania, and the 2017 London Design Fair. By 
comparison, Russia is mostly mentioned in the security-themed news items in the Moldovan news (73). This 
was in relation to the conflict in Ukraine and the Minsk agreements, the conflict in Transnistria, and the 
terrorist attack in St. Petersburg. The other categories of items within which Russia was frequently reported as 
an actor are other (67) and international relations (48).  
 
 




Table 3C. Topics of news items in Ukraine per actor. 
Actor MS&EU MS Russia EAEU EU Total 
Culture 0 28 4 0 0 32 
Economy 2 8 8 0 3 21 
Energy 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Environment 0 5 0 0 0 5 
History 2 11 3 0 3 19 
Immigration 0 1 3 0 0 4 
International 10 48 40 0 35 133 
Other 2 37 39 0 3 81 
Political 8 40 10 0 9 67 
Reforms 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Rule of law 1 17 23 0 3 44 
Security 7 66 72 0 7 152 
Values 0 3 27 0 0 30 
Total news items 18 (4 %) 198 (48 %) 155 (37 %) 0 (0 %) 4(11 %) 416  (100 %) 
Source: Authors 
 
In Ukraine (Table 3C), both Russia and the individual member states of the EU were mentioned most often in 
the news items about security (72 and 66 items respectively). The EU and its member states mentioned in the 
context of the EU were most often presented as an actor in news items about international relations (events, 
meetings, agreements), with 45 news items. In the category of news items about international relations, there 
were many mentions of the EU in the context of agreements on visa-free movement with Ukraine and Georgia 
(25 items), showing that this issue was presented as one of great importance. Other issues among the news 
items on international relations were discussions of the sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine in the 
conflict on its territory, and European Parliament elections. Also individual member states were mentioned 
many times in the context of international relations events (48 news items). By comparison, Russia was 
mentioned 40 times in the context of international relations and many items were in regards to its relations 
with the U.S. and talks between Russian (Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov) and American officials 
(President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson). Surprisingly, economic news items were not a 
common theme of the news in the monitored period in Ukraine. The EU was mentioned explicitly in the 
context of economy only three times (all about Ukraine receiving 600 million euros of aid from the EU) and the 
sum of the economic news items related to the EU and its member states individually or as a part of the Union 
is only 13. Russia was also not frequently mentioned in economy-themed news (eight times). It could be that 
economic matters were discussed during the international meetings and events, which is the most popular 
theme in which the EU and its member states were mentioned, but economy has not come to the fore as the 
topic presented in the news programmes. 
  
5.6. Values in the news items 
 
The analysis also shows a noteworthy pattern in the distribution of news items about values. The values 
category included items about human rights, family values and identity (ethnicity, religion, language). The EU 
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and its member states (individually and as a part of the EU) were mentioned in the context of values more 
often than Russia and the EAEU in Belarus (50:26) and Moldova (81:41).  
 
In Belarus, items pertaining to values in relation to the EU and its member states discussed immigration and 
refugees, controversies about wearing niqabs and burkas, and incidents and terrorist attacks in Sweden, 
France, Germany, and the UK. Russia was mentioned as an actor in the context of values in a diverse set of 
items, covering mourning after the terrorist attacks in St. Petersburg, the celebration of the Belarus-Russia 
Union State, and the celebration of the 1st of May and commemoration of Victory Day on the 9th of May.  
 
Out of the three countries, in Moldova the EU was mentioned most often in the context of values (21). 
Examples include financial aid to Moldova aimed to improve the rights of citizens and their access to housing, 
education and health-care, as well as conditions in Moldovan prisons. The EU was an actor in a couple of news 
items about ethnic relations in Moldova and enhancing cooperation in education in Transnistria. Protests in 
France, Spain, and Romania were among the items that drew attention to the values and human rights in the 
individual member states. Russia was mentioned in the context of values in, for example, news items about the 
Orthodox holidays and Patriarch Kirill, celebration of Victory Day, a diplomatic scandal pertaining to Russian 
money laundering in Moldova, the exclusion of the Russian participant from the Eurovision Song Contest, and 
the fight against a Russian game encouraging teenagers to commit suicide. 
 
By contrast, in Ukraine, Russia was mentioned much more frequently when discussing values than the EU and 
its members (27:3). The news items featuring Russia often covered the imprisonment of Ukrainians in Russia 
and violation of human rights in Crimea. 
 
5.7. Which topics are covered most positively by whom?     
 
The analysis of the interaction between the tone and the theme of the news items (see Tables 4A and 4B, and 
Figure 2) shows that overall, Russia has the best balance when meetings, conferences, events are discussed and 
the worst when it comes to bilateral events and external events (a result driven largely but not entirely by the 
Ukrainian sample). Russia is an actor in human interest stories much more often than the EU (65 items 
compared to 6 items respectively). However, the majority of the human interests news items about Russia that 
have a tone are negative (50 % negative items, 37 % positive items, 13 % balanced). Unsurprisingly, the tone 
towards Russia is most likely to be positive when Russian news sources are used. It is altogether balanced when 
a programme uses its own reporting, and mostly negative when the source is mixed or unclear. When it comes 
to specific topics, the most negative ones are rule of law, security, values, other, and political. There is positive 













Table 4A. Tone (presence and type) per topic per actor: Russia and EAEU 
Actor No tone Tone Balanced Negative Positive 
External events or developments 160 155 24  81  50  
Human interest stories 35 30 4  15 11 
Meetings, conferences, events 35 59 12 22 25 
Bilateral relations and programmes 49 122 16  73 33  
Other 35 50 11 25 14 
Visit from a state official 23 27 3 7 17 




Table 4B. Tone (presence and type) per topic per actor: EU and the member states mentioned in the context of 
the EU 
Actor No tone Tone Balanced Negative Positive 
External events or developments 90 30 9  12  9 
Human interest stories 3 3 0 0 3 
Meetings, conferences, events 28 30 9 3 18 
Bilateral relations and programmes 51 74 14 2 58 
Other 13 23 10 2 11 
Visit from a state official 11 10 3 1 6 
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In terms of the interaction between the tone and the theme of the news items about the EU and its member 
states, the balance is prevailingly in favour of positive messages, especially when the theme of the item is 
bilateral relations. The only theme that has more negative messages than positive ones is external events and 
developments (40 % negative to 30 % positive). When European or U.S. sources are used to report about the 
EU, they are mostly balanced (54 % of messages with tone) and the distribution between positive and negative 
messages is equal (23 % positive and 23 % negative messages). When a programme’s own reporting is used, 
the items with evaluative tone are prevailingly positive (77 % of items), whereas when Russian sources are 
used, the EU is presented mostly in a negative light (50 %) or in a balanced way (38 %). 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The presence of a growing constellation of organizations and associations linked with Russia is clearly visible in 
Belarus and Moldova, while in Ukraine it is diminishing (with the exception of the self-declared Donetsk and 
Luhansk republics). The abundance of actors focusing on ‘compatriots’ and Russian-language speakers reflects 
the key ideas of the 'Russian World' narrative discussed above. Youth and veteran organizations and 
compatriot councils are often linked to their local Russian embassies. Next to Russian identity (with common 
‘Slavic’ heritage playing a similar role), shared Orthodox religion is stressed in Russian messages and can be 
transmitted correspondingly by the ROC and affiliated organizations in all three countries. Educational linkages 
continue to exist, even in Ukraine, often linked to funding distributed by umbrella organizations. These civil 
society linkages (Levitsky and Way 2006: 384) do not necessarily promote authoritarianism as a system of rule, 
but often represent values and ideas that stand in opposition to the values and ideas supported by the EU. 
 
Based on our brief overview of linkages with Russia, we do not find evidence of authoritarian diffusion, but 
rather of the promotion of Russia’s role as a centre of gravity aiming to appeal to Russians, Slavs and Orthodox 
Christians. By funding organizations and activities, Russia clearly aims to promote its own soft power, without 
necessarily offering a clear model of government. Instead, a critique of the EU’s liberalism aims to undermine 
EU policies, sow scepticism about democratic governance and is often coupled with the promotion of 
‘traditional values’.  
 
It should not be assumed, however, that the existence of such a range of linkages in Belarus, Moldova, and 
Ukraine guarantees that Russia’s messages actually dominate the information space in the EaP countries 
uncontested. What is clear is that the societal organizations promoting Russian messages are increasingly 
active in the countries we have examined, especially in Moldova and Belarus. However, the TV monitoring 
shows that messages about Russia are not uniformly positive, and messages about the EU are mostly positive 
or balanced. 
 
Domestic political elites can influence the density of linkages by promoting some actors or banning others. This 
is visible if we compare Russian linkages in Belarus and Moldova to those in Ukraine after the annexation of 
Crimea in 2014. Still, the diversity of organizations and linkages based on language and shared past is such that 
we do not expect that elites can remove all channels of Russian influence or even that it would be normatively 
desirable to do so. 
 




As the discussion of the growing influence of Russian messages transmitted through linkages and channels and 
communication shows, it is hard to keep any country completely closed to messages and narratives. Social 
organizations and local actors, including the media, can play the role of amplifiers that can re-transmit, increase 
(or decrease) the volume, and perhaps modulate the messages of external actors. 
 
The results of our TV monitoring bring further nuance to our conclusions. If we go by the news presented on 
national rather than Russian TV, Russia does not have a more positive image than the EU in the countries we 
monitored. This provides a welcome contrast to the bias on Russian news reported by other studies and to the 
analyses of fake news referred to in Appendix 1.  
 
Previous media monitoring studies (Monitoring report executive summary 2015) have suggested that national 
broadcasters in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova strive to provide an alternative to Russian propaganda, by 
ensuring balanced coverage. Our finding of a large portion of news items having no tone or positive or 
balanced tone confirms that. The majority of mentions of the EU or Russia in the news we monitored had no 
tone—that is, they were not biased in one direction or another. If we compare the tone of messages about 
Russia with news about the EU, more of the news about the EU was balanced or positive, while more of the 
news about Russia was negative. Predictably, if we include Russian TV channels, this picture changes with news 
being largely positive about Russia and more likely negative about the EU. At the same time, we also note that 
Belarusian channels cover Russia more positively on the whole which may reflect the media freedom 
limitations they experience, bringing them closer to transmission belts for official government views. 
 
Moreover, TV monitoring provided interesting insights into which topics dominate the news on the EU and 
Russia in each of the EaP countries. For example, in Belarus, Russia receives significantly more coverage on 
economic issues than the EU. The EU and its members feature mostly as actors in international events and 
political and institutional developments (such as votes in the EU bodies). Furthermore, when the EU is 
mentioned in the context of values, its image on Belarusian TV is not that of a human rights promoter, but of 
an actor that struggles with the challenges of multiculturalism and terrorism. This is different than in Moldova, 
where the EU and its member states  are mentioned more often in an economic context than Russia is. The 
greatest emphasis on the Moldovan news is put on the EU as an actor involved in the country’s reforms. This 
suggests that the image of the EU as a transformative power in Moldova is not only present in the EU’s 
communications to Moldova (Dimitrova et al. 2016), but also reflected in the domestic news in this country. 
Russia, in comparison, is most often covered in Moldovan news in relation to security issues regarding the 
conflicts in Ukraine and Transnistria. Interestingly, Russia received substantial coverage in news items 
discussing history and commemorations, while individual member states of the EU received attention in news 
items discussing cultural events and values. In this set of themes, the Moldovan channels seem to strive to 
achieve a balance between promoting European culture and respecting the common historical heritage of the 
Soviet Union. In Ukraine, the EU does not emerge as a transformative power in the news programmes, as it is 
not mentioned either in the context of the economy or in the context of reforms. Instead, it is primarily 
portrayed as a rather abstract player in the international arena participating in events, meetings, and 
agreements. In contrast, Russia is presented as a destructive actor in the context of security and human rights 
values. 
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The connections between domestic and international actors and messages amplifying (or countering) Russian 
narratives and undermining the efforts to promote the EU’s messages are increasingly clear. Further research, 
which we undertake in a report that will follow this working paper, is needed to establish which EU or Russian 
messages resonate with citizens and affect their causal beliefs.  
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8. Appendix 1: Studies and Organizations Monitoring Fake News 
Source About Link  Affiliation, members 
Disinformation 
Review 
Russia Today spreads systematically fake 
news calling it alternative news.  
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/inside-rts-world-
of-alternative-news/ 









via Disinformation  
Review, 
The escalation of digital age propaganda 







CODA: A web 
platform for 
journalists focusing 





How propaganda influences Ukraine and 
impacts other countries in the world. 




Civil Society Forum 
Recommendations on Combating 
Disinformation and Propaganda 
Based on the results of the EaP CSF project 








in the Eastern 
Partnership Civil 
Society Forum 
EAST Center Anti-Belarus disinformation campaign in 
Russian media. 
http://east-center.org/media-analysis/  Eurasian States in 
Transition (EAST) 
Research Center, a 
Warsaw-based think-
tank 
EAST Center Top 10 fake news in Moldova 2016-2017. http://east-center.org/top-10-fake-
news-moldovan-media-2016-2017/  





An introductory guide to Russia's doctrine 
and activities in this field, including 







Four Russian narratives on NATO’s 
deployment in Europe: the Baltic States are 
paranoid or Russophobic; that NATO is 
unwelcome; that NATO cannot protect the 





DFRL at the Atlantic 
Council 
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EP research service Fake news information sheet, rise of fake 







EP research service The role of Russia’s disinformation 






EUobserver Investigation of the stories spread by 
Russian media: using sex, scandals, migrants 




The Moscow Times How the Russian propaganda is organized: 
excerpts from the military handbook and an 





The Moscow Times 
 Analyses of media monitoring in Georgia, 
reviewing anti-Western messages and 
disinformation disseminated by Georgian 









Monitoring of Russian propaganda in 























Georgian Charter for 
Journalistic Ethics 
(Georgia) 
The Institute of 
Modern Russia 
How the Kremlin weaponizes information, 
culture and money to achieve foreign policy 





The interpreter and 
The Institute of 
Modern Russia 






The Martens Centre Less than a quarter of the Russian 
population has a positive opinion of the EU, 
due to anti-EU propaganda of the Kremlin. 
Three main narratives: the EU is an 
aggressive and expansionist enemy, the EU 
is a weak union that cannot deal with global 






The official think 
tanks of the 
European People’s 
Party, The European 
Parliament 
  
The EU and Eastern Partnership Countries 
An Inside-Out Analysis and Strategic Assessment 
Against the background of the war in Ukraine and the rising 
tensions with Russia, a reassessment of the European 
Neighborhood Policy has become both more urgent and 
more challenging. Adopting an inside-out perspective on the 
challenges of transformation the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries and the European Union face, the research project 
EU-STRAT seeks to understand varieties of social orders in 
EaP countries and to explain the propensity of domestic 
actors to engage in change. EU-STRAT also investigates how 
bilateral, regional and global interdependencies shape 
domestic actors’ preferences and scope of action. Featuring 
an eleven-partner consortium of academic, policy, and 
management excellence, EU-STRAT creates new and 
strengthens existing links within and between the academic 
and the policy world on matters relating to current and 
future relations with EaP countries. 
 
 
